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Thie writer need hardly apologize in choosinfe the
subject of CAVEAT 7MPTOR for a tl-hesis subject for *1 e 'has
fully had his first views strengti-ened, that is/ that it was
an important and interesting subject.
Arising as it did in a cormwrercial e,.,e, it took the
form best adarted to 1 romote commercial welfare, and although
it was extremely strict in its first usage it 'has now become
an almost perfect rule, whereby not only the seller but also
the buyer is protected.
It has belen the 1urpose of the writer to give
a clear and accurate analysis of the law in theo following
pages. For this 1urpose he has dividj the subject
into several heads, endeavoring thus to make them more
complete. 71ith this slirht introduction I hiesitatingly
offer my work.
CAVRAT EMPTOR.
The meaning of tie maxim caveat eml tor is given
to be, let the buyer beWare, and aprlied to urcmhases of all
descrirtions. wletlher of lands or goods, as well to t110 title
as to the quantity and quality.
The law requires t1he purcl aser in all cases to use
the utmost diligenc<'in the investigation of tle right, title
and quality of the thiing to be purchased, and if he does not,
then, in the absence of positive fraud on t'he part of the
vendor, he must take t]'ie goods as he find-s them with all
faults. If the buyer wishes to secure himself against
bein-, imposed upon , ]he can require a warranty and t1 -e arti-
cle must agree with this warranty. In view of these
facts, we can formulate the 7eneral rule as follows: In
the absence of either fraud on the part of the seller or
the buyer not having required a warranty, Le rule of caveat
emptor u ually ajpilies.L
i. Morris v. Thompson, 8b Ill. it_; Boman v. Olemner,, 00
Indiana 10; Richardson v. Bauk, 42 Iowa, 185; Seixas v.
Wood, P Cainnes 48. Hargous v. Stone, j9 N.Y. 73;
Parkinson v. Lee, 2 Rasts, 3O; Hopkins v. Tanquerey, lo
0.-. 30.
The early law of Pngland partook of th e civil law
and the decisions were based upon 1the rule 'of that system,
known as caveat venditor.
1Tnder both systems tIhere is an implied warranty
of title on the sale of chiattels,but in regard to the res-
ponsibility of the seller to answer for, the quality there is
a vast and irreconcilable difference.
According to the civil law and this was the very
early T -lish doctrine, a sound price implies a warranty of
the soundness of the article sold. Under the present rule,
the vendor is not bound to the vendee for the quality or
goodness of the thing sold except in the case of fraud or
warranty.
The historical growth of the rule has to me always
seemed the best way to learn the rule at the present time
and with this point in view, I have endeavored to Tired the
early TRnglish cases upon this subject and to trace their
subsequent changes. Also to note the -American decisions
which we will see have not changed so much.
Before the case of Stuart v. Wilkins,, decided!
L 1 Dry. 20
in 1/78, and t1e earliest Qase whlich Ilaces ti-e doctrine
before us, it was the current olpinion that a sound price
was a warranty of soundnoss.
In this case the most exptreme rule was formula-
ted, in the endeavor to escape from the civil doctrine and
it even went so far as to set aside implied warranties en-
tirely making the rule, that the rraxim would aillly in every
case where there was no fraud or an express warranty.
In the case of Chandellor v. Lupus, decided in 1792, the
derendant, a goldsmitli, sold a stone which he said was a
bezoar, it was, however, a chear stone of anbother kind of
lesser value. It was held that the bare affirmation that
it was a bezoar, without warranting it to be such was no
cause of action, and although the seller knew that it was
not a bezoar, it was not material. For as the learned
judge says "Everyone in selling wares will affirm them to be
good, or the horse he sells to be sound".
In Parkinson v. L e-# decided1 in 1802, ll -he
judges agreed that the rule of caveat emptor applied to
sales of all kinds of comnodities and that without an express
1. 2 'ast's 320.
warranty by the seller or fraud, the buyer must stand to
his losses.
The 14nglish jud ,, however, look-with disfavor
upon these early cases and endeavore,] to again chan-e the
law, so as to raise an implied warranty in certain cases,
f'eelin r, as ,r. Woodson who in his lecture says# "The doc-
trine is decidedly ufair". Thus they took upon themsel-
ves to change it, admitting for that purpose some of the
doctrine of the civil law; this doctrine was that of an im-
plied warranty on the sale of the goods.
In the case of Hilbert v. Shea decided in 1807
and in Gardner v. Gray, 1815 where Lord 7llenborough deci-led
that a sale by sample raised an i rplied warranty that the
bulk equalled the sample. This case however, was decided
in this manner because the buyer had no opportunity to
inspect the goods, but it is sufficient to show us that the
doctrine of implied warranty was being accepted by the
Frnglish courts. In the case of Okell v. Smith- tin cans
were sold and did riot answer the purpose for which they were
ordered; it was held that there was an implied warranty that
1. 2 Wood, 415.
2. 4 Camp. 76.
6. 1 Starkie, 86.
they were fit for use and further that if the buyer gave
the seller notice he was bound to take t~ em away, or they
remained at his risk. In Prown v. TdinF'ton, it was held
that the implied warranty existed in the sale of rope for
a specific puriose, and in jones v. 7owden#, the Th lish
Common Pleas decided that a warranty was implied from the
usages of trade. And so I could name innumerable cases
changin7 the early doctrine in tngland. Tlhe 2-;lish
cases at the present time follow these cases rather than
those w'ich so strictly enforce the rule of caveat emntor,
and it places upon the seller certain restrictions which are
fair and just.
While t 1le Eng-lish courts have drifted from the
very strict rule -nd have raised an implied warranty in some
cases, yet th e g-enelal rule requires an express warranzy.
Likewise in this country we find the cases to be almost
similar ant to the effect that there must be an express
warranty which is followed in all states except South
Carolina and Louisiana and enforced in Maryland with only
1. 2 Man. and '-ran. 2/U.
2. 4 Taun. 841.
one exception i. e. where inspection is impossible.
In Seixas v. Wood#, Thompson, J. says "In all
cases express warranties must be male"but this was a very
early case &nd should not be taken without some modification.
No judge at the preserit time would say "in all cases".
So Justice Selden says "Where there is neither
fraud nor warranty, and the buyer receives and retards the
goods without objection, he waives the right to object after-
ward. Ordinarily this is the rule in t-is country#.
We have noticed in the preceding pages that
there is a continual reference to warranty, and that express
warranty is generally required to Fuard against caveat
emptor; we have likewise endeavored to show that this is
not always the case.
Although express warranty has little to do with our
subject, we will introduce some slio-t suggestions in regard
to it as it may not be without value. In the sale of
real property express warr nty is usually given, but in
1. C ainnes 48.
2. 1 Wall 301.
3. Dean v. Morey, 33 Iowa, l:O; Moore v. Mcinay, 5 Cal.,
471; Pac. I. W. v. Newell, 34 Conn., 67; Bernar v. Iellog
10 Wall, 38&. Welch v. Carter, I Wendell, 185.
the sale of personialty unless tie seller actually assures the
buyer of tle existence or nonexistence of a fact pertaining
to the bargain, the seller does riot warrant the goods ex-
pressly.
The intention of t~he party is of tbe greatest im-
portance in these cases and the whole force of tThe bargain
may be chanfged by sT-owing that tlhe intention was different
from the action. It Iias been said by ]olt J.0. and has
been uniformly adopted '"T'at an af.Jirmation at the time of
sale is a warranty if it apy-ears to have been so intended".
Warranties are interpreted like oti-er contracts,
but one point that Lseems of great importance is that a mere
expression of opinion can never be construed as a warranty,
and as most cases arise under this misconception, T will
cite ihe leading ones in a note#.
Often in the absence of express warranties the law
raises a presumption in favor of the buyer, and upon these
presumptions rests the law of implied warranties which will
occupy our attention during the remaining pages.
1. Thompson v. McNight, 75 Ili. 89; Hankins v. Pemberton,
51 N.Y. 198; Weiner v. Clement, 61 Penn state 117.
Tmplied warranties are lividel into two j arts;
First, implied warranty of title; Second, irnrlied warranty
as to quality of the goods sold.
,The early fnvlish rule lid not recognize any im-
plied warranty of title, the rule of caveat emptor applied.
Coke says "The mere act of selling does not brin with it
the responsibility of triving a gool title". aaron Parke
finds that this may be accounted for on the ground that in
older days the question of title did not enter into mens
minds or intentions because the sales were cormonly made
in market overt where the title obtained by the buyer was
good against all save the soverei7n.
The doctrine is fully sustained in the case of
M-orley v. Attenborough# where it was held "That F pawnbro-
ker in selling wares T3oes not warrant the title in absence
of express warranty".
The doctrine does no longer exist in 'England or
America, and it is now settled that there are implied
warranties in the sale of p-dersonal -royerty, but the au-
thoritics are still unsettled as to what facts must exist
1. Coke Lit. 102.
2. 2 Ex. 500.
in order that sucli a warranty can be implied.
Benjamin, in his work on Sales, considers tho
doctrine settled in the following cases: First, in an
executory contract of sale, the vendor, by implication,
warrants his title in the goods; Secondly, if 'he affirms
that the chatiels are his own, he warrants the title.
And no implied warranty can arise First, where the vendor
expressly refuses to assert his own title. The cases are
all agreed on this proposition and hold that the vendor's
position to the goods is i nconsistent with an inference
of t i tle-#.
And in regard to judicial sales, it is held that
the doctrine of warranty of title never exists and that
caveat emptor always ail lie"
Our courts , ave held in some row cases that an
implied warranty exists in every case where the seller fails
to disclose the effects of th e title, but this seemingly is
too harsh a rule and the general rule in t}is country as well
as in 7nfrland is that whzen the seller has actual or potential
possession of the goods, that there is an implied
1. Pu--v. Maxey, 15 Ill.--; Hicks v. Skinner, 71 .C. 5,59;
2. McManus v. Keath, 49 Tll. 388; McGuire v. Faber, 'r-2
Penn. state 436.
w,-ILwar~ranty-I"
These decisions arise out of tre presumption th-at
"every seller undertakes thatlthe commodity which ho sells
is his own"';-. IJicholz v. Bannister settles the rule in
7nrland and arOTAts the following "That one on, the sal,, of a
chattel implies an affirmation by tlie vendor that it is his,
unless the seller shows by evidence that his intention was
not to assert ownership, but simply o dispose of his inter-
est".
Special attention is to be paid to the fact that
it is not required of the selier to have actual possession
of the goods. All that is required is that possession
be obtained when necessary. A warranty of title may be
on princil:le implied from any unequivocal act of ownership;
when one undertakes to sell goods, he asserts his dominion
over the proyerty and exercises tlhe power of an absolute owner
for no one else but the true owner can 7ive a -ood title,
except in the f,.w cases noted before, therefore the reason-
1. Peoples Pank v. Yuatz, 99 Penn. state, 344; Carlylev.
Hanks, 2, Wis. 74; MAorris v. Thompson, 85 Ill. 16;
Wallach v. -Tree, 104 Mass. 4 ;
2. Blackstone Com. 451.
able presumption is, that one who undertakes to sell fKoods
without saying anything to the contrary, is the owner and
is selling hs own goods. And this warranty of title
extends even to bonds, stocks and to other incorporeal per-
sonalty '.
The general rule so far as the quality of the art-
ile sold is concerned is cav,,at emptor; there being no
warranty of quality unless one is expressly demanded or
given. This is followed in all states save South Carolina
and Louisiana, and has been spoken of in a different con-
nection. flenjamin says in his admirable work on Sales
"The rule in such cases is caveat emptor, by which is
meant that when the buyer, has no warranty he takes the
quality upon himself".
In Vesy v. Dayton# Metcalf' J. says: "The plaintiff
has not to rely upon the representation of value as facts,
or to place any confidence in it. Such representation,
however exaggerated, false and deceptive, is not actionable,
if the subject be open to inspection, he is bound to examine
1. 99 Penn. State.
2. Benjamin on Sales Chap. 840
3. 3 Allen 380.
for himself or take a warranty."
In Penninger v. Thomrson-# tie suit was for the
price of a horse, and the detferise concealing that the horse
was diseased. Ogden J. says: "It cannot be concealed that
K got a great advantare in trade and put upon r, a defective
and windbroken horse, yet the question arises whether a'
legal defense was established. No warranty appears to
have been given and none can be inferred. This is the
rule in England# and in the United States#-.
This rule is simply the outcome of the rule by the
courts of not interfering in matters where by personal vigi-
lance and due exercise of care a person could protect himself.
In no case do the courts aid a person for the lack of care
in his own behalf, the idea being to fosier self-reliance;
but in a case where fraud has been perpetrated with a ready
hand to aid in replacing the wrong.
The rule of caveat) emptor also applies where the
/
person has inspectod the goods carelessly as the courts
1. 24 Albany Law Journal, 257.
2. Jones v. just, L.R. 3 Q.T. 197; Hopkins v. Tanqueray,
10 C. T. 20; Vent, 478.
Bowman v. Cleeves, ;'0 ind. 10; Pichardson v. Bond, 4, Iowa
l8o; Day v. Pool, 52 N.Y. 416; Kimberg v. Taylor, 29 aine,
.308;
will not the person to take advantage of his own carelessness
and some authorities even refuse to relax he rule when a
buyer has special confidenue in the seller's honesty.
Such as in a case where t ere was a false reresentation as
to ihe market value by a seller who knows to a, purchaser
who does not. The purchaser had confidence in these state-
ments, but the court held, that as the article was one of
general commerce and no particular knowledge was necessary
to ascertain the price, that if one party wished to act
under such circumstances, he cannot thereafter repudiate
the contract. This seems to be very poor law and has few
adherents, for if we are not allowed to place confidence ii
persons whom we trust our social and business life would soon
be rotten with meanness and deceit.
As the courts look to justice in most cases, they
have applied the doctrine of caveat eMptor upon the buyer
after he has had ample or-.Iortunity to inspect the goods and
thus been .laced in a position to find any defects, which
existed, and it is no more than just that if he has not been
placed in this position it is no more then just to imply a
warranty in his favor. Some courts hold that the goods
i'urchased under such circumstances shouldI be mecr.antable#.
The foregoing propOsition as to the rule of a3Iply-
ing caveat emptor are subject to certain exceptions, and we
will now consider these.
T!,e first exception to the g,;eneral rule is found
in the case where goods are bourht by samrle.
So .'reat is the use Of samrie in the sale of rools
that all large mercantile houses carry on tl cir business in
tis manner, thus simplifyingr it greatly. Such being the
usual manner of carrying on these transactions, t!ere must
of course be some 1Irovisions made which will giv'; to the
buyer some security, thus the courts have provided, that is
a sale by sample there is always an implied warranty that the
bulk will equal the sample in quality#. Tn Bradley
v. Thornpson it is said: "Where goods are sold by sample there
is an implied warranty that the bulk of the goods so deliv-
ered shall correspond with the sam] le exhibited#,. In
11ansen v. Burke n implied warranty exists th at tl-e bulk
equals the sample exhibited.
1. 10 Wallace, 388; 49 Ill. 275.
2. 22 Texas 270.
3. 4;5 Ill. 499.
These cases are followed in all thie states,
for it is plainly to be seen if such were not the rule, the
sale by sample would have no meaning, and it appeears to me
to be nothing more t"an the doctrine that the seller must
deliver that which he has agreed to sell. The identity
of the goods seems to be the essence of the contract, and
when the goods sold do not agree with the sample there seems
to be no performance of the contract.
The burden of proof in such cases is upon the ven-
dor to prove that the bulk was equal to the sample.
In Penn. however, tilere is no implied warranty fhat
ti,,e $',oods sold by sample are equal to the sample in quality
and likewise that there is no implied war-anty against
latent defects which exist in the goods and which appear in
the eami le. Tliis, however, is the rule in most states-;.
In case the bulk does not agree .with the sarmple,
the vendee of course need not take, the goods, and has a
reasonable time to come to a decision.
1. Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Penn. State 619.
2. 62 Conn. 146.
In a case; in 2 Barh an Adolf the name of which
I have forgotten we find the following-: "If the groods do
not agree with the sample when deliered, the vendeO is
not merely justified in not receiviri them, but Tie may re-
ceive and examine, and if found to be wantinfg in quality or
description, he may return it to tlie vendor in a reasonable
time.
It is held in Illinois not only that the goods may
be rejected, but if the vendee accerts he may recover the
difference in value, between the samrle and the goods sent#.
In Fngland, if the goods are sold by sample and
they are delivered and accepted by the purchaser he cannot
return them; but if he does not completely accept them,
that is, if he has taken the delivery conditionally, he has
a right to -ive them a fair trial, anr if they are found not
to correspond with the sample he may return them. In
Scotland. if they do not agree, he can return them at any time
It will be seen that th-is is an important subject
so that it will be necessary at first to find out just what
1. 65 Ill. 512; 79 Ill. 131.
constitutes a sale by sample for if it is not by samijle no
implied warranty will exist.
The mere showing of the sample does not necessarily
make the sale one by sample. The mere exhibition of a
sample on a sale amounts only to a representation that the
I
sample ha6 been taken from the bulk of the commorlity of-
fered for sale.
In 1ar rous v. Stone# it is said by Paige J. :
"Rvery exhibition of a sample does not per se make the
sale by sample. There must be an agreement to sell by sam-
ple or at least an understanding' that the sale is to be by
sample" .
The opportunity to inspect the goods is an impor-
tant element in determining w1etler or not the parties in-
terlded to make it a sale by sample. Tf the buyer has no
opportunity to inspect the goods and a sample is exhibited
at sale and offered him for examination, the courts would
presume that it was a sale by sample and would recognize a
warranty of correspondence of the sample with the goods.#
1. o N.Y. V. ' Atwater v. Clancy, IO ass. 369.
2. 2 Tiedemanl8-- Day v. Raquet, 14 Minn. 282
Suppose a person enters a store and simply descri-
bes the ,oods, havinr no sample no samle with Ttim, the
buyer purchasing simply by description. In such cases
there is an implied contract that tT-e goods will be equal
to the descrirtion uion which the sale was made.
Ordinarily the courts will not hold a mere descrip-
Tion to amouant to a warranty unles it is made in very
definite terms. If 7oods are sold under a trademark -he
goods delivered must be such as app-ear under the trademark
represented, and such as are known by th at name.
Our at-Gention will next be occupied, in consi-derin.;
in what cases and implied warrant exists on th e sule of prio-
visions. The subject is to be divideM into two rartb.
First, where th, e provisions are sold for immediate
use in the family. qecond, where tley are sold as mer-
chandiso in the C0gul-r course of business.
First, ' en, if a r erson expTressly sells meat or
p-rovisions for family use, 'e is usually I-bell3 to ,-,ive a
warranty thlat tiley are wholesome and fit for family use.
T-e cases in le TniteA States are well settled on
this point and the decisions -ire probabLy !)ased] on the prin-
ciple of paublic I olicy. For it is fo the advant,-,e of
the public as re-arls tl-eir heaith, and unpiincipied dealers
will always take every I ossible advantag,.) that th-ey can ret
over the buyer.
Mr. Story says: "That as to the sale of provis-
ions for immediate domestic use and consumption, s3uch a
warranty (sreakin7 of' implied warranty) is necessary for the
preservation and life#.
So in thie case of Babcock v. Tyleir, it was held
that when corn was sold for family use th-ere was an implied
warranty that it waE wholesome nut there seems to be
another 1:.hase to sucl" cases, and the courts have given much
weig ht to thle position of the seller in such sales; pres-
uming tlat a vendor of an article of food from th e nature
of his calling knows whet'her they are wholesome or not.
Thus much misconception arises between tle action of deceitt
and implied warranty.
1 Story on Sales, 6/6. Norehouso v. Cemstock, 4? '4fis.626.
TToover v. Peter--, 16 ,ich. ol.
2 Howard v. -Pmerson, 110 Mass, 521.
Althouwr an , nai'i E n7 sh case which Mri. Scj odler refers to
says "Tf a man sells victuals which is corrupt without a
warranty an action lies- because it is ax;tinst the common-
wOaltl"I ani 'lackstone says in his Commentaries "That on
the sale of provisions tiere is always an implied warranty
of wholesomeness", still as tTe la tteij cites no utho'ity,
and the citation to the first is unknown, and as the later
cases are contrary to this docti'ine we think that we can
conclude thTat they rest upon statutcs. For Lord Ten-
derton says "That if a man buys pIrovisions and wishes to
trust his own knowledge, the law should not interfere".
So also. in the case of ?urby v. Role-tt# it was held that
a person who sold a pig was not liable under implied warranty
because none of the autholrities suggested a warranty except
in the case of victualers, butchers and other common dealers.
As before stated, this arises from no contrqct
of warranty but as a liability imposed by statute.
Such statutes are the 51st Hen. III and the
Merchandise Act of 186,, __j e 2 Vict. 88.
I 16 Heel'son and Walby civen in Bei-ijamin, pIIara.U24.
But if t}ie goods are sold as mere merchandise by
dealer to dealer no such a warranty is implied, for the
goods are conside 'e1 as oT.-er articles of commerce and unles
there is an express warran-ty, T<.he courts will not raise one.
1,o warranty arises because the subject rnatt .v• is ultimately
to be used as food and 'Mr. Tiedeman says that the case is
parallel with that of .]he vendor of razors, riot oriinal
with .him, who on being remonstrated with by one of his pur-
chase's, claimed exemption fr'om liability for the worthless-
ness of the razor as a razor on the ground that razors were
made to sell and not to s'have with.
'Wile the law in tke sale by descriT, tion is-,that
the article shall corresljond to the description, the law
goes a step further in the case of a m.,nufacturer of goods.
M"ich of our goods are eith er manufactured for us or are
bought for a specific purpose, and as an implied warranty is
raised in some of these cases, we will consider them and
endeavor to learn when caveat emptor alyrlies.
7irst, the case when a Ierson purc-":ases from a
manufacturer. Here T1!.ere is always an implied warranty
that they shall be merclhanzable, but in order that this
can be tlhe case, thie buyer must rely on Che manufacturer's
skill, for if The relies on hiis own judgmrent c-aveat emptor
rules. " contract oL> salo, rrri -.n witi, .j mnufacturer of
r-oods, carries with it an obligation that the ;<oods shall
be merchantable"., qo in "ardner v. i s
person can insist t}hat thle goods be of a larTicular fineness
unless h e h as a warranty, but teat tl-ey are merchantable
should be Veld". In tlie case of selling spool silk,
Lord 71lenborouli considered the law settled that without
any particular warranty, there is an implied warranty that
the goods are salable. Tut this implied merchantability
is limited, only ,for so long as they are in the seller 'l.
possession and in order' that a warranty exist for any
length of time arter they leave the seller's control and
during transit an express warranty should be ,,iven-.
In the case of 7oods ordered and supplied for
particular purpose, there is it ai- ears an implied warranty
that they are reasonably fit and Irorer for the 2 urpose for
I Ilargus v. Stone, I geld. 76; rayard v. Allen 53 N.Y. 51b)
McClung v. Velly, 21 Iowa, 308.
,Iardner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144.
wV'ich they were IL, url-,,USe(i. TTIc purpose is tl e essential
element of t-e contract in sucT cases. Tn a case wli1ere
copper sheatV ing was to be used on a barrre anJ pr,,oved defec-
tive, the defedrlant 1,Lar knowledge of 1ile purpose foi' which
it was to be used and the court held that he was liable upon
an implied warranty, that it was fit for t1lie lurpose for
which it was Surc-ased. o in a Pennsylvania case "If
a iing is ordered of the manufacturer for a slecial purpose
There is an implied warranty that it is filt for that pur-
pose. This principle has been carried very far, it must
however, be lirnitd to cases where a thing is ordered for
a special purpose, not applied to those where a special thing
is ordered although it is intended to be used for a special
purpo se. "
The law rests upon the trust placed in the rnanu-
facturer and in his skill in his particular branc-_ an.- by
implying a warranty tTey simply enforce a rule that a man
oun'ht to be fit to do the work ,-at 'he contracts for, es-
pecially if' it requires particular skill.
1 .Jones v. Boyle I Stark, 384.
2 P. (. I. Oompany v. Groves 08 Penn State 149.
Jackson v. Weat'herill 7 S.&R. 482.
Tlut in SucP, cases the buyer must let the seller
know the use Clie t'h-ing is to be put to, f'or as IIr. ScToule'
says he is not expct o TO know wi-Olout h1einz,, told. p, ile
the case of Jones v. Just adds sevQral othr heads, in
which the doctrine either a!l]-lies or does not, we think we h-v
have absorbed alL ti -, p )ssible eases unde' othe)r heads.
One is a, t to conclude that the excer-tions are so n-
numerous as to overthrow the general rule and that caveat '4re
emrtor is burdened with too many. This, however, seems
to me to be a hasty and uncalled-fLor criticism, for in every
case where the rule is depqarted3t'from, it would be contrary
to the ;r inciple of caveat eml-tor, to allow the sale to
stand for the buyer would be inder such disability Lhat to
allow the rule would be contrary to all justice, and it is
hardly necessary for me to say t1 at the court s do strive to
do justice, although the average 1,i1 son' idea varies
ireatly from that of a lawyer's.
A rule such as this can only be of great value, for
by exercising its functions it encour 'es trade and pre-
vents innumerable suits. For if' the buyer does not beware
he has no remedy and if' the ru e were set aside one can
easily see how the cormmencernent o[ one suit would at once
give rise to aitotlior.
'he one 1rinci it is not to raise obligations nless
actually male between the 1r-,'ties, anI by its o].i oation the
b-llci- is 1"lace'] in a secure l'osition, and the buyer has
himself' to blame i.' h. vas not caumius. But mlioere fI'aud
has been committed the doctrine cannot be eil'orced, for
altliouji the buyer' may beware, he cannot gfuard agRainst
tl-e viciousness of' the seller and the .ouris take iT upon t -,
themselves to protect him.
And in ending our subject we have but two words
which we wish to imress upori the minds of the readers "Ca-
veat 7mrtor".

